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1. Introduction
It is known that Arrow’s (1963, p. 97) theorem and the Gibbard (1973) - Satterthwaite
(1975) theorem, two of the fundamental results in economic theory, are closely related
results. Reny (2001), for instance, provides a single proof of both theorems, whereas
Barberà (2001) presents a result of which the two theorems are special cases.
This note provides additional connections between the two theorems. A first connection
concerns the theorems themselves, since both are proved following a common proof
that relies on a dictatorial result for choice functions. A second connection refers to the
conditions peculiar to each theorem, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) in
Arrow’s theorem and stratregy-proofness in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. On the
one hand, it is shown that both IIA and SP are inconsistent with a mild majority
principle; and, on the other, that the same assumption can lead from IIA to the
dictatorship result in Arrow’s theorem and also from stratregy-proofness to the
dictatorship result in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. These connections are briefly
discussed in Section 5.
2. Notation and definitions
Let N = {1, 2, ¼ , n} be a non-empty finite set whose members designate individuals, A
a finite set with m ³ 1 elements representing alternatives, L the set of rankings
(complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relations) that can be defined on A and
Ln the set of profiles (P1, … , Pn), where, for all i Î N, Pi Î L. Rankings on A are
identified with sequences (x1, … , xm) such that A = {x1, … , xm}, the interpretation
being that xr is strictly preferred to xs if, and only if, r < s. For P Î Ln, x Î An and J Í
N, xi and Pi denote the ith component of x and P, respectively, whereas PJ abbreviates
(Pj)jÎJ. For J Í N and i Î N, -J abbreviates N\J and -i abbreviates N\{i}.
Expression means
         kr   for 1 £ k £ m, the kth alternative xk in the ranking r = (x1, … , xm) Î L
    p(x, r)  the position of x Î A in ranking r Î L (the number k such that kr = x)
      r½B  the restriction of r = (x1, … , xn) Î L to B Í A, that is, the ranking s = (y1,
… , yb) such that b =½B½and, for all y Î B, p(y, s) £ p(y, r)
      xry p(x, r) < p(y, r): x Î A is above (or comes before) y Î A\{x} in r Î L
     xPJy  for J Í N and P Î Ln, abbreviation of “xPjy, for all j Î J”-3-
       rxy  the ranking s Î L obtained from r Î L by exchanging x Î A and y Î
A\{x}: p(x, s) = p(y, r) and, for all z Î A\{x, y}, p(z, s) = p(z, r)
       r­x  the ranking s Î L obtained from r Î L by ranking x the first: 1s = x and,
for all y Î A\{x} and z Î A\{x, y}, p(y, s) £ p(z, s) Û p(y, r) £ p(z, r)
   (xJ, y–J)  the member x of An with, for all j Î J, xj = x and, for all j Î N\J, xj = y
   (xJ, z–J)  the member x of An with, for all j Î J, xj = x and, for all j Î N\J, xj = zj
       PJ
­x  for non-empty J Í N and P Î Ln, abbreviation of (Pj
­x)jÎJ
x covers y in r p(x, r) + 1 = p(y, r), where x Î A, y Î A\{x} and r Î L
Definition 2.1. A social welfare function (SWF) is a mapping f : Ln ® L. A social
choice function (SCF) is a mapping g : Ln ® A. A choice function (CF) is a mapping h :
An ® A.
Definition 2.2. A set J Í N with r ³ 1 members is decisive if it is decisive for all x Î A
and it is decisive for x: (i) in a SWF f if, for all P Î Ln and y Î A\{x}, xf(P)y when xPJy;
(ii) in a SCF g if, for all P Î Ln, g(P) = x when, for all i Î J, 1Pi = x; and (iii) in a choice
function h if, for all x–J Î An–r, h(xJ, x–J) = x.
Definition 2.3. Social welfare function f [social choice function g, choice function h] is
dictatorial if, for some i Î N, {i} is decisive in f [g, h].
Definition 2.4. A social welfare function f satisfies: (i) PAR (the Pareto principle) if,
for all x Î A, N is decisive for x; and (ii) IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives) if,
for all P Î Ln, Q Î Ln, x Î A and y Î A\{x}, (P1½{x,y}, … , Pn½{x,y}) = (Q1½{x,y}, … ,
Qn½{x,y}) implies f(P)½{x,y} = f(Q)½{x,y}.
Definition 2.5. A social choice function g is: (i) onto if, for every x Î A, there is P Î Ln
such that g(P) = x; and (ii) strategy-proof (SP) if, for all i Î N, (Pi, P–i) Î Ln and Qi Î
L, it is not the case that g(Qi, P–i)Pig(Pi, P–i).
3. A dictatorial result for choice functions
A CF h : An ® A is interpreted as a voting rule: for x Î An and i Î N, xi is the alternative
for which individual i votes and h(x) is the alternative the choice function chooses. This
section presents a result for CFs on which the common proof of Arrow’s theorem and
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in Section 4 hinges.-4-
A1. For all x Î An, h(x) Î {x1, ¼ , xn}.
A2. For all x, z Î An, if h(x) = x and {i Î N: xi = x} Í {i Î N: zi = x} then h(z) = x.
A2*. For all x Î An, if h(x) = x then {i Î N: xi = x} is decisive for x.
By A1, if h(x) = x then there is i Î N such that xi = x, so h(x) is chosen from the set of
alternatives some voter votes for. A2 can be viewed as an independence condition: if h
chooses x then, as long as the set of individuals voting for x is not reduced, x is still the
alternative h selects. A2 also admits a non-manipulability interpretation: when h
chooses x, the members not voting for x cannot force h to choose another candidate by
voting otherwise. Observe that A2 is equivalent to A2* above, which asserts that if J Í
N can enforce alternative x once then J is decisive for x (this property is related to
Denicolò’s (1998) relational independent decisiveness condition).
Lemma 3.1. Let n ³ 2 < m, Ø ¹ J Ì N, x Î A, y Î A\{x} and h : An ® A satisfy A1 and
A2. If h(xJ, y–J) = x then J is decisive.
Proof. Assume h(xJ, y–J) = x. By A2, J is decisive for x. Consider next z Î A\{x, y}. By
A1, h(zJ, x–J) Î {x, z}. If h(zJ, y–J) = y then, by A2, h(xJ, y–J) = y: contradiction. Thus,
h(zJ, y–J) = z and, by A2, J is decisive for z. Consider finally y. By A1, h(yJ, x–J) Î {x,
y}. Choose z Î A\{x, y}. If h(yJ, x–J) = x then, by A2, h(zJ, x–J) = x, contradicting the
fact that J is decisive for z. Hence, by A1, h(xJ, y–J) = x and, by A2, J is decisive for y.
￿
Proposition 3.2. If n ³ 2 < m then every h : An ® A satisfying A1 and A2 is dictatorial.
Proof. Being N finite and, by A1, decisive, it suffices to show that J Í N decisive
implies {i} Í J decisive or J\{i} decisive. Let J Í N be decisive, i Î J, K = J\{i}, x Î A,
y Î A\{x} and z Î A\{x, y}. By A1, h(xi, yK, z–J) Î {x, y, z}. If it is z then, by A2, h(yJ,
z–J) = z, contradicting decisiveness of J. If it is x, by A2, h(xi, y–i) = x so {i} is decisive
by Lemma 3.1. And if it is y then, by A2 and Lemma 3.1, K is decisive.
￿
4. Parallel proofs of Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
For SWF f : Ln ® L, define f* : An ®® A to be the mapping such that f*(x1, … , xn) :=
{x Î A: x = 1f(P), for some P Î Ln with (1P1, … , 1Pn) = (x1, … , xn)}. For SCF g : Ln ®
A, let g* : An ®® A be the mapping such that g*(x1, … , xn) := {x Î A: x = g(P), for
some P Î Ln with (1P1, … , 1Pn) = (x1, … , xn)}. If F : An ®® A is such that, for all-5-
x Î An, F(x) has one element then F is identified with the function G : An ® A such that,
for all x Î An, G(x) = x, where {x} = {F(x)}.
The strategy to prove both Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is
summarized below (the “Ý” implications are not proved as they are easy to prove). On
the one hand, it is shown that, when n ³ 2 < m, if a SWF f satisfies PAR and IIA then f*
is a choice function that satisfies A1 and A2. By Proposition 3.2, f* is dictatorial. Since
f* dictatorial makes f dictatorial, it then follows Arrow’s theorem. On the other hand, it
is shown that, when n ³ 2 < m, if a SCF g is onto and strategy-proof then g* is a choice
function that satisfies A1 and A2. By Proposition 3.2, g* is dictatorial. Since g*
dictatorial makes g dictatorial, it then follows the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
Arrow’s theorem
With n ³ 2 < m and f : Ln ® L
f satisfies PAR and IIA
ß Ý
1f(P1, … , Pn) Î {1P1, … , 1Pn}
1f(P1, … , Pn) = x implies that
{i Î N: 1Pi = x} is decisive for x in f
ß Ý
f* such that f*(x1, … , xn) := {x Î A:
x = 1f(P), for some P Î Ln such that
(1P1, … , 1Pn) = (x1, … , xn)}




With n ³ 2 < m and g : Ln ® A
g is onto and strategy-proof
ß Ý
g(P1, … , Pn) Î {1P1, … , 1Pn}
g(P1, … , Pn) = x implies that
{i Î N: 1Pi = x} is decisive for x in g
ß Ý
g* such that g*(x1, … , xn) := {x Î A:
x = g(P), for some P Î Ln such that
(1P1, … , 1Pn) = (x1, … , xn)}
is single-valued and dictatorial
ß Ý
g dictatorial
In this respect, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem could be viewed as an unsuccessful
attempt to escape from Proposition 3.2 by transforming the domain of the CF from An-6-
to Ln, whereas Arrow’s theorem could be viewed as an unsuccessful attempt to escape
from Proposition 3.2 by simultaneously transforming the domain of the CF from An to
Ln and its codomain from A to Ln.
Lemma AR1 states that if x is at the top of the social ranking f(P) and IIA holds then: (i)
x remains at the top when an individual changes his preference concerning two
alternatives that he ranks both above x or both below x; and (ii) if some individual
exchanges in his ranking the position of x with a contiguous alternative y then the social
top is x or y. Lemma GS1 states the same for a strategy-proof SCF g.
Lemma AR1. Let n ³ 2 £ m, f : Ln ® L satisfy IIA and, for a given P Î Ln, 1f(P) = x.
If Qi Î L is such that {y Î A: xQiy} = {y Î A: xPiy} then 1f(Qi, P–i) = x.      (1)
If x covers y in Pi and Qi := Pixy then 1f(Qi, P–i) Î {x, y}.      (2)
Proof. (1) Since 1f(P) = x and, for all y Î A\{x}, Pi½{x,y} = Qi½{x,y}, by IIA, x is above
every y Î A\{x} in f(Qi, P–i), so 1f(Qi, P–i) = x. (2) As 1f(P) = x and, for all v Î A\{x, y},
Pi½{x,v} = Qi½{x,v}, by IIA, v cannot be above x in f(Qi, P–i). Thus, 1f(Qi, P–i) Î {x, y}.
￿
Lemma GS1. Let n ³ 2 £ m, g : Ln ® A be SP and, for a given P Î Ln, g(P) = x.
If Qi Î L is such that {y Î A: xQiy} = {y Î A: xPiy} then g(Qi, P–i) = x.      (3)
If x covers y in Pi and Qi := Pixy then g(Qi, P–i) Î {x, y}.      (4)
Proof. (3) Suppose g(Qi, P–i) = y ¹ x. If xQiy then, as g(Pi, P–i) = x, g is not SP. If yQix
then, as yPix, g is not SP. (4) Suppose g(Qi, P–i) = z Î A\{x, y}. If zQiy then g is not SP
because g(Qi, P–i)Pig(Pi, P–i). If xQiz then g is not SP because g(Pi, P–i)Qig(Qi, P–i).
￿
Whereas Lemmas AR1 and GS1 are purely instrumental results, Lemmas AR2 and GS2
are arguably the most significant results in the paper; see Section 4. By Lemma AR2, if
x is at the social top in f(P), IIA holds and the set of individuals ranking some y ¹ x at
the top is non-empty then, for at least one of those y, x remains at the social top when y
is raised to the top in all the rankings in which x was not at the top. Lemma GS2 (whose
proof mimics exactly the proof of Lemma AR2) expresses the same result for a
strategy-proof SCF g.
Lemma AR2. If n ³ 2 £ m and f : Ln ® L satisfies IIA then, for all P Î Ln, if 1f(P) = x
and K := {i Î N: 1Pi ¹ x} ¹ Æ then, for some v Î {1P1, … , 1Pn}\{x}, 1f(PK
­v, P–K) = x.-7-
Proof. There is nothing to prove if, for all i Î K and j Î K\{i}, 1Pi = 1Pj so let y and z be
two members of {1Pi}iÎK\{x}. With I := {i Î N: 1P1 = z}, choose j Î K\I with 1P1 = y.
By a simple induction argument it is enough to show that 1f(PI, Pj
­z, P–(IÈ{j})) = x or
1f(PI
­y, Pj, P–(IÈ{j})) = x.
· Case 1: zPjx. By (1), 1f(PI, Pj
­z, P–(IÈ{j})) = x.
· Case 2: xPjz. Let J := {i Î I: xPiy}.
  · Case 2a: J = Æ. By (1), 1f(PI
­y, Pj, P–(IÈ{j})) = x.
  · Case 2b: J ¹ Æ. With Qj defined from Pj by putting z just below x,
1f(Qj, P–j) = x by (1). Let Rj := Qjxz. By (2), 1f(Rj, P–j) Î {x, z}.
  · Case 2b1: 1f(Rj, P–j) = x. By (1), 1f(PI, Rj




­z, P–(IÈ{j})) = x.
    · Case 2b2: 1f(Rj, P–j) = z. For i Î J, let Qi := Pixy. By (1), 1f(QJ,
Rj, P–(JÈ{j})) = z. By (2), 1f(QJ, Qj, P–(JÈ{j})) Î {x, z}. If it is z, by (1), 1f(PJ, Qj, P–
(JÈ{j})) = z, which contradicts 1f(Qj, P–j) = x. Thus, it is x. By (1), 1f(QJ, Pj, P–(JÈ{j})) = x.
Also by (1), 1f(QJ
­y, PI\J
­y, Pj, P–(IÈ{j})) = x. As PJ
­y = QJ
­y, 1f(PI
­y, Pj, P–(IÈ{j})) = x.
￿
Lemma GS2. If n ³ 2 £ m and g : Ln ® A is SP then, for all P Î Ln, if g(P) = x and K :=
{i Î N: 1Pi ¹ x} ¹ Æ then, for some v Î {1P1, … , 1Pn}\{x}, g(PK
­v, P–K) = x.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma AR2, replace “1f”, “(1)” and “(2)” by, respectively, “g”,
“(3)” and “(4)”.
￿
Lemma AR3 asserts that the top in the social ranking is one of the tops in the
individuals’ rankings. This result requires IIA to be complemented by some assumption
of the Paretian type, such as (5). The interpretation of Lemma GS3 is analogous.
Lemma AR3. If n ³ 2 £ m and f : Ln ® L satisfies IIA and (5) below then, for all P Î
Ln, 1f(P) Î {1P1, … , 1Pn}.
For all P Î Ln and x Î A, if 1P1 = … = 1Pn = x then 1f(P) = x.         (5)
Proof. Suppose not: for some P Î Ln, 1f(P) = x Ï X := {1P1, … , 1Pn}. By successive
application of Lemma AR2, for some y Î X\{x}, 1f(PN
­y) = x, which contradicts (5).
￿
Lemma GS3. If n ³ 2 £ m and g : Ln ® A is SP and satisfies (6) below then, for all P Î
Ln, g(P) Î {1P1, … , 1Pn}.-8-
For all P Î Ln and x Î A, if 1P1 = … = 1Pn = x then g(P) = x.         (6)
Proof. In the proof of Lemma AR3, replace “1f”, “(5)” and “AR2” by, respectively, “g”,
“(6)” and “GS2”.
￿
By Lemma AR4, a SWF satisfying IIA and (5) is monotonic: if x is at the social top and
raised in some individual ranking, x remains at the social top. Observe that this result
requires at least three alternatives. The interpretation of Lemma GS4 is analogous.
Lemma AR4. Let n ³ 2 < m, f : Ln ® A satisfy IIA and, for given P Î Ln, 1f(P) = x. If
(5) holds and y covers x in Pi then 1f(Pixy, P–i) = x.
Proof. By Remark AR6, PAR holds. By (2), 1f(Pixy, P–i) Î {x, y}. Suppose it is y. With
z Î A\{x, y}, I := {j Î N\{i}: xPjy} and J := {j Î N\{i}: yPjx}, let R Î Ln differ from
(Pixy, P–i) only in that xRizRiy, xRIzRIy and yRJxRJz. By PAR and xRNz, 1f(R) ¹ z. As
1f(Pixy, P–i) = y, by IIA, 1f(R) = y. Let S Î Ln differ from P only in that zSiySix, zSIxSIy
and ySJzSJx. As 1f(P) = x, by IIA, 1f(S) Î {x, z}. As zSNx, by PAR, 1f(S) ¹ x. Thus, 1f(S)
= z and IIA fails: yf(R)z, zf(S)y but, for all j Î N, Rj½{y,z} = Sj½{y,z}.
￿
Lemma GS4. Let n ³ 2 £ m, g : Ln ® A be SP and, for given P Î Ln, g(P) = x. If y
covers x in Pi then g(Pixy, P–i) = x.
Proof. With Qi := Pixy, assume g(Qi, P–i) = z Î A\{x}. If zPix then g(Qi, P–i)Pig(Pi, P–i),
so g is not SP. If xPiz then xQiz; that is, g(Pi, P–i)Qig(Qi, P–i) and g is not SP.
￿
By Lemma AR5: (i) (1P1, … , 1Pn) = (1Q1, … , 1Qn) implies 1f(P) = 1f(Q) and,
therefore, f* is a CF; and (ii) 1f(P) = x makes {i Î N: 1Pi = x} decisive for x in f*. Thus,
a SWF satisfying IIA and (5), and hence PAR, induces a CF satisfying A2. Lemma GS5
is an analogous result for SP SCFs satisfying (6) (see Remark GS6).
Lemma AR5. Let n ³ 2 < m and f : Ln ® L satisfy IIA and (5). Then, for all P Î Ln,
1f(P) = x implies that {i Î N: 1Pi = x} is decisive for x in f.
Proof. Let 1f(P) = x and I := {i Î N: 1Pi = x}. By a simple induction argument it suffices
to choose j Î N and show that 1f(Qj, P–j) = x, with Qj obtained from Pj by exchanging
two contiguous alternatives v and z such that x Ï {v, z} if j Î I. So let j Î N and vPjz.
· Case 1: x Ï {v, z}. By (1), 1f(P) = x yields 1f(Qj, P–j) = x.
· Case 2: z = x. Lemma AR4.-9-
· Case 3: v = x. By (2) and 1f(P) = x, 1f(Qj, P–j) Î {x, z}. With 1Pj = y Î A\{x,
z}, it rests to derive a contradiction from 1f(Qj, P–j) = z. By Lemma AR3, K := {i Î N:
1Pk = z} ¹ Æ. Let J := {i Î K: xPiy}. For k Î J, let Qk := Pkxy.
  · Case 3a: J ¹ Æ. By (1), 1f(Qj, P–j) = z implies 1f(Qj, QJ, P–(JÈ{j})) = z.
By (2), 1f(Pj, QJ, P–(JÈ{j})) Î {x, z}. If z, by (1), 1f(Pj, PJ, P–(JÈ{j})) = z, contradicting
1f(P) = x. Since it is x, for k Î J, define Rk := Qkyz and, for k Î K\J, define Rk := Pkyz. By
(1) and 1f(Pj, QJ, P–(JÈ{j})) = x, 1f(Pj, RK, P–(KÈ{j})) = x. This and (2) yield 1f(Qj, RK, P–
(KÈ{j})) Î {x, z}. It is not z by Lemma AR3. Hence, it is x. By (1), 1f(Qj, QJ, PK\J, P–
(KÈ{j})) = x. By Lemma AR4, 1f(Qj, PJ, PK\J, P–(KÈ{j})) = x, contradicting 1f(Qj, P–j) = z.
  · Case 3b: J = Æ. By Lemma AR4, (1) and 1f(P) = x, 1f(QK, P–K) = x. By
(1), 1f(Qj, P–j) = z implies 1f(Qj, QK, P–(KÈ{j})) = z, which is an instance of case 3a.
￿
Lemma GS5. Let n ³ 2 < m and g : Ln ® A be SP and satisfy (6). Then, for all P Î Ln,
g(P) = x implies that {i Î N: 1Pi = x} is decisive for x in g.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma AR5, replace “1f”, “(1)”, “(2)”, “AR3” and “AR4” by,
respectively, “g”, “(3)”, “(4)”, “GS3” and “GS4”.
￿
Remark AR6. If f : Ln ® L satisfies IIA then f satisfies PAR if, and only if, (5) holds.
Remark GS6. By Lemma GS4, if g : Ln ® A is SP then g is onto if, and only if, (6)
holds.
Arrow’s theorem: If n ³ 2 < m then every social welfare function f : Ln ® L satisfying
PAR and IIA is dictatorial.
Proof. By Remark AR6, PAR implies (5). By Lemma AR5, f* is a function satisfying
A2. By Lemma AR3, f* satisfies A1. By Proposition 3.2, some {i} is decisive in f*. By
Lemma AR5, {i} decisive in f.
￿
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: If n ³ 2 < m then every onto and strategy-proof
social choice function g : Ln ® A is dictatorial.
Proof. In the proof of Arrow’s theorem, replace “AR6”, “PAR”, “(5)”, “AR5”, “f” and
“AR3” by, respectively, “GS6”, “ontoness”, “(6)”, “GS5”, “g” and “GS3”.
￿-10-
5. Comments
It is worth recapitulating the connections and similitudes between Arrow’s and the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem that emerge from the results in Section 4.
To begin with, both theorems can be reduced to a common impossibility result for CFs:
Proposition 3.2. On the one hand, this suggests that both theorems could be viewed as
unsuccessful attempts to escape from that impossibility result. On the other, it indicates
that it is as if a SWF sastisfying the conditions in Arrow’s theorem generated the social
top, and the way a SCF sastisfying the conditions in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
selected the social choice, by resorting to an extremely simple rule: a CF (which in
addition happens to be dictatorial).
In each theorem, the two assumptions are necessary for the CF reduction to be possible.
In fact, IIA would be objectionable if a SWF satisfying IIA made f* a function, as this
would mean that the social top is determined disregarding how individuals rank below
the top. The same objection could be adduced against strategy-proofness if a SP SCF
made g* a function. The following examples prove that, for n ³ 2 < m, none of these
objections can be raised: the inversely dictatorial SWF (there is i Î N such that, for all
P Î Ln, 1f(P) = mPi) satisfies IIA but f* is not a function; and the SCF g such that, for
some x Î A, some i Î N and all P Î Ln, g(P) = 1Pi if 1Pi ¹ x and g(P) = 2Pi if 1Pi = x, is
SP but g* is not a function.
This notwithstanding, (essentially) the same assumption ((5) for SWFs and (6) for
SCFs) added to IIA and SP yields Arrow’s and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem,
respectively. The weakness of that assumption suggests that IIA and SP put SWFs and
SCFs too close to dictatorship (Wilson’s (1972) theorem is already evidence of this
observation for SWFs; see Saari (1998) for an illuminating analysis of IIA).
But perhaps the most interesting connection between IIA and SP that the proofs in
Section 4 reveal comes from Lemmas AR2 and GS2. Actually, these results sustain the
following common criticism to IIA and SP: for n ³ 3 £ m, both IIA and SP are
inconsistent with the mild majority principle MP according to which, if a strict majority
of individuals (but not all of them) rank some alternative x at the top, then x must be at
the top of the social ranking for SWFs and must be the social choice for SCFs. To see
this, let x, y and z be different alternatives and {I, J, K} a partition of N such that I and J
have: (i) n/3 members if n is a multiple of 3; (ii) (n + 1)/3 members if n + 1 is a multiple
of 3; and (ii) (n + 2)/3 – 1 members if n + 2 is a multiple of 3. Consider P Î Ln such-11-
that, for all i Î I, 1Pi = x; for all i Î J, 1Pi = y; and for all i Î K, 1Pi = z. Assume IIA. If
1f(P) = w Ï {x, y, z}, by Lemma AR2, there are v Î {x, y, z}, t Î {x, y, z}\{v} and i Î N
such that 1Pi = t and 1f(Pi, P–i
­v) = w, which contradicts MP. If, on the other hand, 1f(P)
Î {x, y, z} then, assuming without loss of generality that 1f(P) = x, by Lemma AR2,
1f(PI, PJ, PK
­y) = x, contradicting MP. The same result applies to SP SCFs by invoking
Lemma GS2 instead of Lemma AR2.
References
Arrow, K.: Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. New York: Wiley 1963
Barberà, S.: A theorem on preference aggregation, mimeo, Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona, Spain (2001)
Denicolò, V.: Independent decisiveness and the Arrow theorem. Social Choice and
Welfare 15, 563-566 (1998)
Gibbard, A.: Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica 41,
587-601 (1973)
Reny, P.J.: Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified
approach. Economics Letters 70, 99-105 (2001)
Saari, D.: Connecting and resolving Sen’s and Arrow’s theorems. Social Choice and
Welfare 15, 239-261 (1998)
Satterthwaite, M.: Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and
correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions.
Journal of Economic Theory 10, 187-217 (1975)
Wilson, R.: Social choice without the Pareto principle. Journal of Economic Theory 5,
14-20 (1972)